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NOTES
FIFTY YEARS OF WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION
FORWARD

Workman's compensation laws in Wyoming, like Topsey, "just
growed." This is not to say that the growth has been aimless and without
purpose, but additions, deletions and amendments have been worked to
meet the needs of changing times and circumstances. This material is not
intended to be anything more than a short condensation of the history
of the law, its status today, and some brief notes on areas of conflict
between statutory language and judicial interpretation. In reviewing the
statutes passing through the years, it is interesting to note the constant
play of the balancing of power between labor and management. This is
truly a picture of the American scene.
EMPLOYER'S

LIABILITY-HISTORY

OF

THE

AcT

Prior to the enactment of the laws of compensation, the employee
was left to the vagaries of his common law remedy. In addition to the
expense of litigation (usually prohibitive), the time consumed by the
action often precluded recovery in time to save the employee from secondary
financial disaster. Even if he brought his case to court, he was subject

[26]

NoTEs
to the ancient and hard defenses of assumption of risk, the fellow-servant
rule, and contributory negligence. Reform movements, originating in
England in the late Nineteenth Century, began to reach the continental
United States around 1900. Even then litigation was long, arduous, and
often worked an injustice to one or both parties. Through the application
of the historical defenses the employee was often denied recovery for
injury attributed strictly to the hazards of the business. On the other
hand, employers were held responsible for injury without fault on their
part. Workman's compensation laws were found to be a compromise
between employer and employee, who suffered equally under the old
system.,
In 1910, Wyoming, with ten other states, 2 pioneered in enacting the
first compensation laws.3 The law has remained unchanged fundamentally,
providing for payment to persons injured in defined extra-hazardous
occupations from funds in the state treasury. The fund was declared to
be exclusive, with participation mandatory by employers within the
scheduled types of enterprise. Statutory awards were exclusive of all
other rights and remedies of the employee, his personal or legal representative. Generally, extra-hazardous occupations were limited to heavy
industry, exclusive of those in interstate commerce. Substantial changes
are found in definitional terms. "Children" were those under age 16,
and "injury" was exclusive of the wilful acts of a third party or of disease,
excepting disease resulting from an injury incurred in the course of
employment. Injury caused by a third party, in cases in which there was
no liability on the part of the employer, left the employee strictly to his
remedy at common law. Employer contributions to the fund were two
per cent of payroll, with a minimum account level (after deducting award5
for compensation) of two per cent of his projected annual payroll, but
not less than $5000.
Compensation schedules viewed in the light of today's wages and
expenses, seem small. However, considered in conjunction with a purchasing power of ninety nine cents of the dollar, they were undoubtedly
commensurately adequate with current awards. Temporary total disability awards scaled from $15 per month for the single man, to $35 per
month for a married man with dependents. Permanent partial disability
ranged from $150 for the loss of a thumb to $1000 for the loss of a limb.
Permanent total disability provided a lump sum payment of $1000 for the
single man and $1200 for a married man with no children. If there were
children living under the age of 16, the payment was increased at the
rate of $60 per year for each child until that child reached age 16.
Assuming a married man with three children, ages 5, 7 and 9, the total
lump award would then be $3820. Death benefits were $1000 plus the
above schedule for dependent children, and a burial allowance of $50.
1.
2.
3.

28 R.C.L. 709, 713.
L.R.A. 1917 D, note 82.
H.B. 127, passed ch. 124, L. 1915; ch. 258 Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1920.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of Wyoming, the Territorial
Law limited recovery for death to $5000. Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution
provides "No law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered
for causing the injury or death of any person." In 1904, the Wyoming
Supreme Court ruled that provisions of the Constitution operated pro4
spectively only, and did not abrogate a valid statute previously passed.
As a result of this ruling, the legislature repealed the Territorial statute
and in 1913 authorized a proposed amendment to Art. 10, § 4 of the
Constitution, granting the state the right to accumulate funds and pay
compensation fixed by law to persons injured as a result of employment. 5
This amendment, together with the original workman's compensation law
of 1910, was found to be uniform within the covered classes, and that the
selection of classes covered was not unreasonable or arbitrary, but was
within the discretion of the legislature and that no constitutional rights
were violated.6 Since the workman's compensation statutes themselves
were created within the constitutional authority of the legislature, the
amendment to the constitution did not act to remedy a bad law, but
rather established the law as a mandate of the people.
THE

JUDICIAL

ATrITUDE

Workman's compensation is not contractual by nature, but arises out
of the contract of employment, in the mutual giving up of common law
rights and obligations. As a creature of statute, early courts hostile to the
plan, declared the law impolitic and invalid, violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In N.Y.C. Railroad
Co. v. White,7 a 1916 decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
heard argument on the constitutionality of the New York compensation
law, and found the law to be a valid exercise of the police power and that
classification of covered employment was not arbitrary, nor in contravention of the equal protection of the laws clause.
The Wyoming courts have liberally construed the Act in favor of the
workman. 8 They (the laws) should be construed so that where reasonably possible the industry and not the individual workman should, to a
large extent, bear burdens of accidents suffered within it; 9 but the
Supreme Court will not disregard principles of appellate practice in so
doing.' 0 The Workman's Compensation Act was not intended to give
compensation as damages, but is in the nature of accident insurance; a
compromise between employers and employed, whereby in exchange for
limited liability, the employer pays some claims where in the past no
liability existed."
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Mestas v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co., 12 Wyo. 414 (1904).
Ch. 79, L. 1913.
Trent v. Union Pacific R.R., 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180 (1951).
243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.E. 667 (1917).
Claim of Carey, 74 Wyo. 37, 283 P.2d 1005 (1955).
Christensen v. Sikera, 57 Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557 (1941).
In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 200 P.2d 333 (1948).
Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942).

NOTES

While states may hold forth the proposition that their plan is compulsory, it must be noted that there are limitations and exceptions. Some
states rule that certain types of employment, termed "extra-hazardous,"
are covered, but other occupations, as domestic service and farm labor, are
excepted. Other states provide that municipalities may elect to come
under the Act. Still others allow participation by private insurance carrier
or through a public fund. In addition, there are states which allow both
parties to elect between compensation and common law remedies (see
table, App. A).
WYOMING'S COMPENSATION ACT-

IT's NATURE; REMEDIES; RIGHT OF ACTION
Compensation as provided for in the Act, is for any injury or death
sustained in employment declared to be extra-hazardous. 12 The list is
extensive,' 3 ranging from factory workers to bartenders to power farm
14
employees.
Excluded from the Act are employees of railroads in inter-state commerce,' 5 peace officers, game wardens and coal mine inspectors, 16 and
persons whose employment is purely casual and not for the purpose of the
employer's trade or business. 1"
Employees hired "in state," or who regularly work in the state, are
within the Act if injured by accident outside the state and within a period
of six months from the date of leaving. Extension of coverage beyond
the six month period is subject to notice to the State Treasurer of the
election to retain such employee under the Act.' 8 The problem of complance with the compensation laws of the state where the accident occurs
has been resolved by reciprocal agreements with Colorado, Utah, South
Dakota, New Mexico and California. An agreement is pending with
Nevada.' 9
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Wyo. Stat. § 27-50 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-56 (1959) (Supp. 1959).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-49 (1957)(Supp. 1959) defines power farming as a farm which
uses any power driven equipment where one or more workmen are regularly
employed for an average of six months per year and, where the employer has
elected to come under the Act. Agricultural employers should be alerted to the
fact that they may elect, since a failure to do so places them in a position of exposure
to unlimited judgments in favor of injured employees. Sub-paragraph (II) (b) of
the same section further states that officers of corporations whose business is
classified as extra-hazardous and who are actually subject to the hazards of the
business in the regular performance of their duties, may be covered under the
Act. In order to qualify such persons, a notice of intent must be filed with the
department by registered mail 30 days before the taking effect of such coverage.
Payroll reporting of each person to be covered is not less than $2400, but not more
than $4800. It should be noted that a substantial benefit accures to the typical
head of a family or partnership type corporation. For a maximum cost of $240
per year (tax deductible) , the owner is given practically unlimited accident insurance, and a death benefit which could amount to $17,000 for his family.
Wyo. Stat. § 27-56 (1957) (Supp. 1959)
Wyo. Stat. ch. 7 (1957), Labor and Employment.
Wyo. Stat. § 27-49(l]) (b) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-146 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
Source: Attorney General's Office, State of Wyoming.
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The Act is exclusive of any rights and remedies, at common law or
otherwise, of the employee, his personal or legal representative or dependent family on account of such injury against his employer.20 The
right to compensation from such funds is in lieu of any and all rights of
action against any employer contributing to the fund in favor of such
person. 21 Common law defenses of assumption of risk, fellow-servant and
20.
21.

Wyo .Stat. § 27-51 (1957).
Wyo .Stat. § 27-58 (1957).
While the statutes purport to provide an insured employer complete immunity
from recovery at law by his employee, the possibility of recovery over by indemnity
to a third party sued by the employee should not be completely dismissed.
Rule 14, Wyo. Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the mechanics for a defendant
to implead a person "not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." A third party plaintiff's position
must depend on the Wyoming Court's limitations of the rule denying contribution
between wrongdoers.
In Miller v. New York Oil Co., 34 Wyo. 272, 243 Pac. 118, the rule denying
indemnity or contribution was held inapplicable as against a landlord seeking to
recover the amount paid by him to satisfy a judgment for the death of a tenant
who was asphyxiated by the fumes of a gas water heater negligently installed by
the defendant. The court held the landlord's liability grew out of a non-delegable
duty to the tenant, and his liability was constructive rather than actual. The court
rejected the rule of Merryweather v. Nixon (a leading English case denying contribution or indemnity between wrongdoers), holding that "it has so many exceptions that it can hardly with propreity be called a general rule." The court favorably
cited Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149, 19 Am. Rep. 324, which
repudiated the rule as applied to concurrently negligent parties, and approved
the rule when applied to joint wrongdoers.
Since the Miller decision in 1926, the Wyoming position on idemnity has been
further delineated.
. Wyo. --359 P.2d 885 (1961), the court
In Convoy Company v. Dana,
denied plaintiff's action for indemnity against Dana a, garage owner. Convoy's
employee had left a truck with Dana for repairs on the air brake system. Unknown
to Dana, the emergency brake was also defective, and Dana injured one Burdick
when he moved the truck. Burdick successfully sued the Convoy Company who
in turn sought indemnity from Dana. In the decision the court distinguished Miller,
in that Miller was allowed recovery on the grounds of his absolute liability to a
tenant, passive negligence, and a complete want of knowledge of the hazardous
condition.
In the instant case the court approved the general rule denying indemnity,
when under such circumstances that both parties are joint tortfeasors, or are in
pari delicto, as when each of the parties contributes to cause an injury. On the
facts the court found the plaintiff's negligence in failing to provide an effective
emergency brake, and further failing to so advise Dana was one of the proximate
cause of the injury, where Dana was negligent or not.
In a recent Iowa case (American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d
(8th C.C.A. 1946), under substantially the same statutory limitations as Wyoming,
the defendant American successfully impleaded Kittleson's employer, whose negligence, while passive, was a proximate cause of Kittleson's injury. The court found
that Kittleson's employer was contractually bound by statute to reimburse the
injury through compensation, and that American was liable at law. But between
the employer and American there was no bond, and they were not joint tortfeasors
and not subject to the rule against indemnity .
While all three cases recognize the limitations of indemnity, each rests on a
separate position of the parties. The writer believes that a right of indemnity
over against an insured employer may exist in Wyoming, but only under exceptional
and rare circumstances. In the Miller case, indemnity was allowed against an
actively negligent concurrent tortfeasor by a plaintiff whose liability existed without
fault. The Convoy case denied indemnity when the negligence of the third party
plaintiff was found to be active and a proximate cause of the injury. In order to
apply the Kittleson rule in Wyoming, there must be a passively negligent third
party plaintiff whose negligence cannot be raised to the degree of an intervening
cause. It is not difficult to forsee a situation which fits the requirements of both
the Convoy and the Miller cases. Since the Compensation laws require the employer
to reimburse any injury sustained by an employee, an employee who fails to bring a

NoTms
contributory negligence are not available to the employer, nor may the
22
employer relieve himself from liability by contract, rule or regulation.
Liability under the Act is absolute, for injury incurred within the scope
of employment, subject only to a defense of culpable negligence. 23
The Employer
Employers of covered occupations are required to file with the director
of workman's compensation upon commencing such employment and to
make timely contributions into the fund.2 4 New employers who fail to
comply may be restrained from further employment, 25 and any employer
who fails to make payments when due is subject to double assessment and
fine. 26 If an employee is injured in a covered occupation while the
employer is delinquent, any payment of award by the state makes the
employer personally liable for such award. Recovery is by suit, on the
relation of the state treasurer, and the entry of final order of the court is
prima facie proof of liability.27 This of course means the employer has
forfeited his right to challenge the validity of the claim or to assert a
28
defense. The employee may bring an action at law for his injuries,
or he may recover through the fund, but once the election is made against
29
the fund, recovery at law is waived.
The Fund
Payments to the fund are remitted monthly, equal to 5% of the total
insured payroll for the first twelve months of employment, 3 0 and 1%
per month thereafter, subject to a minimum account level of $2000.31
Such payments are entered to the employer's account, and awards are
charged against that account. Overdrafts resulting in drawing the account
level below the minimum result in an additional monthly levy of 4%
of payroll, until the overdraft is recovered.3 2 Large overdrafts may create
an urge to reorganize the business into another form. This should be
discouraged, since the courts have little difficulty in appending the old
33
liability upon the new firm.
Employer's accounts have a real monetary value, and are fully assign-

22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

tort action against the person who causes injury allows the employers recovery to
go by default, the employer should be entitled to an action for indemnity.
Wyo. Stat. § 27-52 (1957).
Who. Stat. § 27-50 (1957) . While culpable negligence is often a difficult standard
of measure, the Wyoming courts have held the misconduct to be a question of fact,
and each case must be weighed and determined by its own circumstances. Hamilton
v. Swigart Coal Mine, 50 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 149 A.L.R. 998. Culpable negligence is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof is on the employer.
Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., 33 Wyo. 240, 238 Pac. 532 (1925).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-63 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-69 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-68 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-74 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-53 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-51 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-63 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-64 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-66 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
State v. Nugget Coal Co., 60 Wyo. 51, 144 P.2d 944.
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able.3 4 The assignee should, however, make some inquiry into the status
of -the account he is -acquiring, since not only does he succeed to the
rights, privileges and immunities of the assignor, but assumes any obligations of compensation incurred under the account. Possibly in a large
industrial firm this may not be of any consequence, since injuries may
maintain the contribution at the maximum level. But to the small
employer, acquiring an established account immediately reduces his tax
liability from 5% to 1%. Prospective purchasers of existing accounts
should be cautioned to obtain a statement of acount from the State
Treasurer's office. Deficit balances are maintained even though there is
a change in management, and such deficits must be reimbursed by the
owner even though the liability may not be his originally. Unused
balances of accounts in the fund, belonging to employers who have discontinued employment within the state for three years, are closed and
become a permanent part of the industrial fund.
The Employee
Hearing and Appeal.3 5
Recovery for injury is begun by the employee or his representative
making a report of the accident to the employer within 24 hours of the
accident, and by having the report filed with the clerk of court of the
district where the accident occurred. Forms are provided by the state
treasurer, and should be made available by the employer. Claims for
compensation must be made within one year of the accident, and are
also filed with the clerk of court. Claims may be amended at any time
before the original order of award is made. Employer's verified report
of the accident must be filed with the clerk of court, and a failure to
comply is punishable by fine. Upon receipt of the notice of injury and
claim, the judge of that court must immediately conduct such investigation
as is deemed necessary, to determine that the claim is not disputed by the
employer, and that the employee is entitled to the claim. Upon verification of these facts, an order of award must be issued within 60 days of
the notice.
If the employer contests the claim as being non-compensable within
the Act, or from the injury having been caused by the culpable negligence
of the employee, either party may claim the right to trial by jury. Proceedings are summary, and have precedence over the court calendar. The
county and prosecuting attorney represents the workman, against whom no
costs may be assessed. Application for modification of any award may be
made within two years, on the grounds of increase or decrease in capacity,
or upon fraud or mistake. The state treasurer has the right to cause a
case to be re-opened within 30 days of receipt of order of award, but
must show probable cause of error. Any order is subject to review by the
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
34.
35.

Wyo S.tat. § 27-76 (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-104 to 27-131, inc.

(1957).

NOTES
COVERAGE, DEPENDENTS,

MODE OF PAYMENT

Medical and Hospital Care
Undoubtedly the payments gratest in number and least in per unit
cost are those for the every day, minor injury, requiring immediate medical
attention, with or without the loss of a few days work, and subsequent
out-patient treatment until healed. After notice to the employer, the
court may award payment of submitted medical service up to $385, and
hospital costs up to $495. If it appears that the original award is inadequate, or that further expense is necessary, the court may direct that all
additional expenses be allowed for a period up to six months, and may
issue supplemental orders for additional periods so long as the need is
apparent. Costs of the services after the initial ward is not charged to the
employer's account. 36 Ambulance service is included in the award when
required, but must be usual and reasonable, and within the rates set by
the state treasurer.3 7 Where death results, burial expense is allowed up to
$600. 8s It should be noted that warrants issue directly to the attending
physician or servicing hospital,3 9 and also that such payments are free
40
from garnishment or levy, and not assignable.
Disability Awards
Temporary total disability is the result of an injury which temporarily
incapacitates an employee from performing any work at any gainful
occupation for the time, but from which injury such person may recover by
treatment and may be able to resume work . No award, other than for
medical attention is made for the first three days of disability, unless
such disability runs beyond eight days, in which case it is allowable for
the full time of the injury. Payments are equal to 662/3% of the actual
average monthly earnings received for the last three months preceeding
the injury, from the employer for whom he was working at the time of
the injury. Awards are subject to a minimum and maximum, scaling from
$130 per month for a single person to $260 per month for a workman
with four or more dependents. Periods of less than a month are prorated, and payment is allowed for the day of injury, unless full wages
41
were received for that day.
Permanent partial disability, as the loss of one member or portion
thereof, or one eye, is compensable in amounts from $300 for the loss of
a finger, to $6000 for the loss of an arm. Awards for an unscheduled
disability, as a spinal injury or hernia, are discretionary with the court,
42
but based on the proportionate extent of disability and the schedule.
Payment of the award is in monthly installments of $90 per month
to unmarried workmen, and $110 if there is a wife living at the time of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.
Wyo.

Stat. § 27-94 (1957).
Stat. § 27-99 (1957).
Stat.§ 27-101, L. 1951, ch. 204, § 5 (1957).
Stat. § 27-96 (1957).
Stat. § 27-102 (1957).
Stat. § 27-79 (1957) (§upp. 1959), L. 1961, ch. 204, § 1.
Stat. § 27-80 (1957) (Supp. 1959), L. 1961, ch. 204, § 2.
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the injury. Unpaid balances at the death of the claimant are paid to the
surviving wife, or if deceased, then to surviving children. If there are
neither surviving wife or children, the award returns to the general fund,
43
and such amount is credited to the account of the employer.
Permanent total disability is based on the loss of both arms or legs,
loss of sight, paralysis, or other condition which permanently incapacitates
the workman from performing any work at any gainful occupation. 44 An
award of $12,000 is made on the findings, plus a lump sum award equal to
$24 per month for each dependent child or brother or sister under the age
of 18, computed until that child reaches age 18. The lump sum award
for dependencies is limited to a total of $7000, and is held by the state
treasurer for disbursement on order of any Wyoming District Court.4 5
The base award is distributed at the rate of $125 per month to a single
man, and $150 per month to a married man. Upon the death of the
workman (from causes other than the compensated injury), any balance
remaining unpaid in the workman's account returns to the state fund and
46
is credited to the account of the employer.
Awards If Death Results From A Compensable Injury
If the workman's death by the insured accident occurs before other
awards, his widow (or an invalid widower) will receive an award of
$10,000 payable in monthly installments of $125.4 7 Any balance remaining
unpaid upon remarriage reverts to the account of surviving children, or
if there are no surviving children, then back to the state fund. 48 Surviving
children at the death of the employee are granted a lump sum award
under the same terms as under permanent total disability. 49 If there are
neither surviving wife nor children, but surviving dependent parents, an
ward of $3000 is granted for one, and $4000 if both are living. 50
In the event the workman dies of injuries sustained under any of the
three classes of disability, and after an award has been made and payments
received thereon, the following adjustments are made:
1. Following temporary total disability, the widow and children
Wyo. Stat. § 27-81 (1957).
But the ability of the workman to continue in his former employment is not a
conclusive test on the question of his eligibility for total disability. Standard Oil
of Indiana v. Ervin, 44 Wyo. 88, 8 P.2d 447.
45. Wyo. Stat. § 27-85 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
46. Wyo. Stat. § 27-86 (1957) (Supp. 1959). While the statutes do not spell it out, it is
implied that the fund set up for dependent children is not included in the refund
provision. Wyo. Stat. § 27-85 (1957) provides: "There shall be credited to the
account of each of such children .. " Wyo. Stat. § 27-86 (1957) makes provision
for the workman, on showing of hardship, to withdraw any unused portion of his
total award, and further states "provided, that if the workman shall die leaving
an unpaid balance of the award, then such unpaid balance shall be returned to the
fund.' Application of the rule of liberal construction to the statutes would seem
to meet the legislative intent, and to follow the rule set forth by the Supreme Court
in Christensen v. Sikera, supra note 9.
47
L. 1961, ch. 204, § 3.
48. Wyo. Stat. § 27-88 (1957).
49. Wyo. Stat. § 27-89 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
50. Wyo. Stat. § 27-90 (1957).

43.
44.

NOTES

shall receive awards as provided for under the death benefits sections, 5 1
but subject to a reduction in the principal sum of all payments made to
the workman in excess of $2400.52
2. Following permanent partial disability, the death benefits are
allowed to both the widow and children, but all payments received by the
workman are deducted. 53
3. If death follows an award for permanent total disability, an award
is made to the surviving widow only, and all payments in excess of $2000
4
paid to the workman are deducted from the death benefit.5
SUBSEQUENT

INJURY AND DISASTER REINSURANCE

FUNDS

The Subsequent Injury Fund
In the absence of controlling statutes, state administrative agencies
(where applicable) and the courts, have often faced difficult decisions
arising out of subsequent injuries to employees which, when combined
with a previous unrelated injury, clasify the employee as permanently,
totally disabled. Suppose employee John Doe, while working for corporation X, loses his left hand at the wrist. Under the schedule of compensation for permanent partial disability, his medical and hospital expenses
are paid, and in addition he is awarded a lump sum benefit of $5000.
After recovery, and with or without the aid of an artifical hand, corporation
Y employs him in a hazardous occupation. As a result of a "no negligence" accident, he suffers the loss of the right arm. This second injury
places John in the classification of permanent total disability, eligible for
a lump sum benefit of $12,000 for himself, and up to $7000 for his
dependent children. At the same time, corporation Y should not have
to bear the entire burden, since the injury for which it is responsible
would entitle the employee only to a lump award of $6000, the statutory
award for loss of an arm above the elbow.
In the past, corporation Y (or its insurance carrier) had to reimburse
John for the ultimate loss arising out of his latest employment, or John
remained uncompensated for the cumulative burden now placed on him.
Recognizing the injustice to one party regardless of the final decision,
the Wyoming legislature in 1945, 55 introduced and passed H.B. 43, creating
the Subsequent Injury Fund. 56 Under the provisions of this Act, corporation Y contributes only the sum which would have been payable had
there been no previous injury, and after deducting the award for such
previous injury, any sum due as an award for permanent total disability is
paid out of the Subsequent Injury Fund. This amount is not charged to
either employer, since the amount is funded by appropriation.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Supra notes 47, 48, 49.
Wyo. Stat. § 27-91 (a) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-91 (b) (1957).
Wyo. Stat. § 27-91 (c) (1957).
L. 1945, ch. 45, § 3.
Wyo Stat. § 27-149 (1957) et seq.
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It should be noted that in the case of an injury which was caused by
a party other than the second employer, the right of recovery by subrogation is expressly. granted to the Fund, ex rel. the State Treasurer, and that
the Fund shares ratably with the employee. In the absence of any ruling
by the Supreme Court, this would be interpreted to mean that the reimbursement feature operates in a direct ratio of the contribution by the
Fund over the judicial award. If the recovery by judgment is less than,
or equal to the contribution by the Fund, the employee recovers nothing.
57
If the judgment exceeds the contribution, all over goes to the employee.
In order to relieve individual employers of the nearly permanent
liability of total disability or death claims, the legislature, in 1957, created
the Disaster Reinsurance Fund.58 This fund provides for reimbursement
of an individual account of all over $2000 arising out of single claim.
After an award exceeding $2000 is charged to the employer's account,
the Fund pays over into the Compensation Fund the total in excess of
$2000, and the statutory deficit is relieved by the mechanics set up within
the Compensation Fund, wherein the employer's rate returns to 1% of
payroll as soon as the $2000 deficit is paid off. All employers contributing
to the Compensation Fund contribute an additional V2 to

of 1% of

payroll, credited to the Reinsurance Fund, except those firms contributing
5% as their initial rate, or those contributing 4% or more by reason of
overdrafts from previous awards.
SPECIAL

THIRD PARTY

PROBLEMS

LIABILITY

AND

AND

QUESTIONS

REIMBURSEMENT

Wyo. Stat. § 27-54, 1957, amended Laws 1959, c. 198, § 3, provides that
the provisions of the Act shall not bar an employee's right of recovery
for injury sustained under circumstances creating legal liability in some
person other than his employer. This right is in addition to his right to
statutory compensation, and prohibits denial of a favorable judgment on
the grounds of co-existing recovery from the Fund. Whenever such
employee has received compensation benefits, and also elects to pursue a
57.

58.

Particular problems are raised by the application of a subrogation right in the
state. While the writer makes no attempt to present a solution, it is felt that they
should be raised at this time. If the state commences the action, is the employee
a necessary party under Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. As between the
state and defendant, it would appear that he is not; but if he is not made a party,
and the recovery is limited to the state's contribution, has the employee lost his
claim for pain and suffering? Under a pure subrogation action it is apparent the
subrogee is limited to his own loss. The rule of joinder of parties applies to
persons having a joint interest in the claim, but the rule does not necessarily
follow the facts. Here, the state is interested only in recovery of money spent;
the employee is interested in expanding the claim for pain and suffering. Each
claim arises out of a single occurance, and against a single wrongdoer, but each
is for different elements of damage. If the employee brings an original action
against the third party, he will save his case for (1) uncompensated injury, (2)
suit costs, (3) "set aside" under § 27-54. This would serve to defeat the apportionment ratio governing subrogation. If the assumptions are correct, it would
immediately appear that any action under the third party tortfeasor statute should
be initiated by the employee. Failure to do so may result in the giving up of a
substantial right.
Wyo. Stat. § 27-169 (1957) (Supp. 1959).
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recovery from such third party, the State of Wyoming has a right and
interest in the action, and must be joined as a party plaintiff. The state
takes no part in the suit, but the mandatory joinder acts to protect the
state's right of recovery of outlay made by the Fund on behalf of the
employee. Double recovery is not permitted, and a reimbursement formula
set out in the above statute makes the following provision: "After deducting the reasonable cost of recovery or collection, which cost shall not
exceed thirty three and one third per cent (331/3%), one third (1/3) of the
remainder shall in any event be paid to the injured employee. . . Out
of the balance remaining the Industrial Accident Fund shall be reimbursed, if said balance be sufficient, or to the extent of said balance if
insufficient, for the total amount of all awards received by the injured
employee under this Act, including all monies paid to him or on his
behalf for doctor and hospital bills, and for any other purpose on his
behalf under orders of a district court."
Prior to the enactment of the above law, the pertinent portion of
Wyo. Stat. 27-54 (1951) read: "He may also pursue his remedy at law
against such third person, provided that he shall not be entitled to a
double recovery, and in the event that such employee recovers from such
person, he shall be entitled to retain only the excess over any compensation
paid to him, and must reimburse the Industrial Accident Fund for all
moneys advanced to him for such injury, less not to exceed 331/3/ for its
share of the cost of such recovery."
Appealing from a decision of the District Court, Albany County,
awarding the State of Wyoming $9,172.76 as its share of a third party
judgment in favor of Russell Brown, the following facts and arguments were
presented.59 Brown had obtained a judgment from a third party for his
injuries in the amount of $22,500. The state had contributed $13,759.16
through his claims for compensation, and now demanded $9,172.76 as the
amount to be returned to the fund out of the judgment. Brown contended
that, in as much as the compensation award included only $1900 paid
directly to him, the recovery due the state was two thirds of that sum,
and tendered payment of $1266.67. This was refused, and after hearing,
the trial court ruled (1) that compensation was not limited to an award
paid directly to the employee, but included all sums paid to him or on
his behalf, which includes medical and hospital expenses, and (2) that
$13,759.16 was the figure from which reimbursement contribution by the
state was to be computed. Both the trial judge and counsel for each
side construed the current statute to mean that a flat one third be
deducted from the amount paid to the employee as the state's share of
recovery costs, with the remainder to be returned to the fund. Item one
above was upheld in the supreme Court, but item two was overruled and
held erroneous. In the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, it
referred to the qualifying phrase "in the event that such employee recovers from such (third) person," and held that (1) the one-third referred
59.

Brown v. State, 79 Wyo. 355, 334 P.2d 502 (1959).
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to was a maximum figure, to be adjudged by the trial court on the merits
of the case, and (2) that the one-third saved to the employee was to be
one-third of the total judgment, and which was then to be deducted from
the amounts paid to or on behalf of the employee by the Fund. The
judgment of the lower court was reversed, with an order to amend the
state's recovery to $6259.16.
Reduced to comparative figures, the effect of this ruling becomes
apparent:
Results Before Brown v. State
Case No. I
Case No. 2
Case No. 3
(1) Judgment
$22,500.00
$20,000.00
$9,500.00
(2) Funds's Expense
(3) Less 1/
(4) Fund's Share

13,759.16
17,365.89
4,586.38
3,455.29
$ 9,172.78
$14,910.60
Results After Brown v. State
(1) Judgment
$22,500.00
$20,000.00
(2) Fund's Expense
13,759.16
17,365.89
(3) Less V3 line (1)
7,500.00
6,666.67

1,614.49
538.17
$1,076.32
$9,500.00
1,614.49
3,166.67

(4) Fund's Share
$ 6,259.16
$10,699.22
0
Simply put, before the Brown decision, the amount set over to the
injured employee from his judgment was 3 of the payments from the
fund, plus any surplus after the fund was made whole. 60 Following the
Brown decision, the negligent party paid the total judgment, amounts
for pain and suffering were set aside, one-third of the judgment
allocated to recovery for personal expense was set over with the remainder
going to make the fund (and employer) whole. Brown v. State was
settled on Jan. 20, 1959, and immediately thereafter (March 1, 1959) the
amendment to Wyo. Stat. § 27-54 (1959) was effected. The amended Act
not only retains the provisions interpreted in the Brown decision, but provides that in no event shall the fund's reimbursement exceed V of the
remainder of the judgment after deducting the 1/3 "set aside" for costs of
recovery. The combined effects of the Brown decision and the 1959
amendment are seen in the following illustration:
Case No. 1
Case No. 2
Case No. 3
(1) Judgment
$22,500.00
$20,000.00
$9,500.00
(2) Less 1/3
7,500.00
6,666.67
3,166.67
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Fund's expense
Less line (2)
Fund's share
But not more than
(2/

line

(3))

(8) Fund's share
60.

$15,000.00

$13,333.33

$6,333.33

13,759.18
7,500.00
6,259.18

17,365.89
6,666.67
10,699.22

1,614.49
3,166.67
0

10,000.00

8,888.88

4,222.22

6,259.18

8,888.88

0

It should be recognized that in many cases, an injustice was worked on the
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In view of the legislative intent to (1) fully compensate industrial
accidents, (2) save the employee's action at law against third persons,
(3) participate in costs of recovery and (4) prevent double recovery, the
financial result to succesful litigants is somewhat startling.
CASUAL

EMPLOYMENT

Casual employment is a term which has given the courts some difficulty. The problem does not lie within the facts of a given case, but
rather in a general application of the term. In one sense the term relates
to the element of time, and here the courts have found antonyms as
"regular," "certain," "periodic," and "systematic." A thing is casual when
it comes without regularity and is of comparatively minor importance.
It usually is temporary and of short duration. At the same time, it is
said that it is the employment, not the employment of the particular
employee, that is determinative; the nature of the work that was done
leads to the conclusion that the employment was casual.61 A statutory
exclusion of a person whose employment is "purely casual" rather than
simply "casual" was said to call for a strict construction as against the
62
employer, and a liberal construction in favor of the employee.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming examined the claim of an itinerant
painter against a hotel, for injuries incurred in a fall while doing miscellaneous painting at the instance of the hotel manager. In reversing
the lower court and dismissing the claim, the court found that the hotel
keepers were not within the schedule of extra-hazardous employment, and
that the painting was done in the claimant's trade or business, and not in
the hotel's. "Further, if the law applies to hotel keepers under the circumstances here disclosed, it would under the some or similar circumstances apply to storekeepers . . .and perhaps to all owners of a home."6 3
In 1939, the court ruled on a somewhat similar case.6 4 Claimant was
injured while building a scaffolding used in the construction of partitions
in remodeling defendant's store. Defendant denied liability, under the
"casual employment" section of the Act. The court, however, found the
defendant to be an insured employer under the Act, due to its employing
butchers, and further found that it customarily re-decorated and furnished
leased premises, using local tradesmen under the direction of a company
foreman. While granting the employment was casual in that it was not
under an employment contract, was temporary and of short duration, the
court ruled the employment was of a nature regularly engaged in by the
defendant, and the injury was sustained in defendant's regular trade or
business.
While the cases may seem irreconcilable on the facts, it should be
employee, who was faced with attorney fees out of his judgment, which together
with the amount recovered by the fund, may have exceeded the total judgment.
61.

62.
63.
64.

107 A.L.R. 935, 936.

Gardner v. Main St. M. E. Church, 217 Iowa 1390, 250 N.W. 740 (1933).
Lamont v. Intermountain Realty Co., 48 Wyo 56, 41 P.2d 497 (1935).
Pope v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58 (1939).
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pointed out that the Safeway store was an insured employer at the time of
the accident, and under the rule of Christensen v. Sikera,65 the broad
policy is to pass the burden of loss to the employer, who is under the Act.
Even so, it is apparent that Wyoming is following the definition as applicable to the employment within the scope of the business, rather than a
time test.
NON-TRAUMAUTIC

ILLNESS:

DISEASE OR INJURY?

Workman's compensation laws are generally divided into two groups;
those which include occupational disease, and those which particularly
exclude occupational disease. Among the latter, there is a further divergence whether the exclusive remedy of the Act bars a recovery at law by an
employee whose illness is not compensated under the Act. In some jurisdictions where injuries such as lead poisoning, nervous exhaustion and
lung injury from noxious fumes are uncompensated, cases hold the Act
to be exclusive, and bar the employee from a remedy at law. On the
other hand, some jurisdictions have found that an uncompensated injury
or disease allows the employee to proceed at law against the negligent
employer. 66
The difficulty of each position is readily seen. In the first instance,
the employee is denied both the benefits of statutory compensation and
his remedy at law for a hurt occasioned by industry. In the second
situation, the employer is limited by statute as to the type of injury for
which he is insured, and is subject to unlimited liability for types of
injuries on which he may only speculate. In jurisdictions where the coverage is statutory and exclusive of private insurors, he is even denied the
67
opportunity of insuring against such remote possibilities.
On the question of illness and occupational disease, the Wyoming
Legislature has taken a position somewhat between the two extremes.
"The words 'injury and personal injury' shall not include . ..a disease,
except as it shall directly result from an injury incurred in the employment." 66
From this section one would conclude the legislative intent was to
exclude disease excepting it result from an "injury." Injury is usually
associated with some external force applied to the body, attributable to
a definite point in time, and with a physical manifestation of the result.
Disease is commonly alluded to as a deviation from the healthy or normal
condition of any functions or tissues of the body. An occupational disease
is a disease gradually contracted in the usual and ordinary course of the
employment, because thereof, and incidental thereto. 69 The Wyoming
Court, however, has faced the problem squarely in its constant search to
70
compensate the employee for any hurt arising out of the employment.
65.

Supra note 9.

66.

Ann. 100 A.L.F. 519.

67.
68.
69.
70.

See Tables, App. "A".
Wyo. Stat. § 27-49 (III) (b) (1957).
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
Supra note 9
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Silicosis is a lung condition, caused by inhalation of foreign particles
such as grain dust, rock dust or chemicals into the lungs. These particles
become imbedded in the tissue, causing inflammation, hemorrage, loss of
strength, and if untreated, death. The process is usually gradual, and is
cumulative over a long period of exposure. In effect, it is a classic case
of occupational disease. In 1935, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that as an occupational disease, it was not a compensable injury within the Act, but rather that it arose from a series of chance circumstances
eventually causing an injury which was "not the customary and natural
result of the work in which he (the employee) was engaged."7 1 The
court further held that whether the condition in the claimant's lungs was
an occupational disease or a mechanical hurt, it "directly resulted from
an injury incurred in the employment, as contemplated by the statute."
Following the "direct result" rule, the court had occasion to affirm
an award to an employee who became permanently blind from multiple
72
hemorrage of the eyes following the strain of lifting heavy grain sacks.
The hemorages were attributed to a weakening of the eyes by an undected
childhood case of tuberculosis. The court ruled that an "accident" was
an unlooked for mishap or untoward event, which is not expected or
designed. Furthermore, the condition of an employee's health, while
increasing the possibilities of injury, does not bar the event from being a
compensable injury. "It is the hazard of the employment acting on the
particular employee in his condition of health." In rapid order, the court
affirmed an award for the death of an employee by coronary occlusion
73
twenty two days after an injury sustained in the course of employment;
affirmed an award for appendictis following an injury sustained by falling
off a plow; 7 4 but also affirmed an order denying an award to an employee
who died of a coronary occulsion six hours after a fall from a scaffolding. 75 In each of the three cases last mentioned, the court refused to
upset the judgment on the facts, indicating that where there was a conflict of expert medical testimony, but sufficient evidence to warrant a
finding that the external hurt could have been a predisposing cause of the
injury on which the claim was made, the judgment of the lower court
would not be reversed.
Finally, in 1952 the court again met the occupational disease problem
squarely. 76 Here, claimant apparently had a high allergy to certain medicants used in the clinic at the training school and developed a critical
case of contact dermatitis, requiring extensive treatment and causing loss
of employment. In this case, the Wyoming position on non-traumatic
injuries became fully developed. Borrowing from the preceding decisions,
the court said (1) bodily injury accidentally sustained is an unusual or
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

In re Pero, 49 Wyo. 131, 52 P.2d 690 (1935).
In re Scrogham, 52 Wyo. 232, 73 P.2d 300 (1937).
White v. Mavarick Prod. Co., 63 Wyo. 452, 182 P.2d 818 (1947).
In re Grant, 54 Wyo. 382, 82 P.2d 463 (1939).
In re Corey, 65 Wyo. 301, 200 P.2d 333 (1948).
Wright v. Wyo. State Training School, 71 Wyo. 173, 255 P.2d 211
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unexpected result attending the operation of a necessary act or event;
(2) it is the hazard of the employment acting on the particular employee;
(3) individual allergy or weakness is immaterial if the particular conditions of employment in fact cause the disability.
Whether traumatic or non-traumatic, occupational disease or remote
consequence, it is apparent that Wyoming will not be faced with the problem of common law litigation between employee and employer for noncompensated injuries arising while in the course of employment. If the
facts are sufficient to sustain a finding of a casual connection between
the employment and the hurt, an award must be made from the Fund.
If the facts do not sustain such a finding, collateral recovery is barred
on the facts.
FRANK

M.

ANDREWS
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APPENDIX A
Compensation
State

Compulsory

is:
Elective

Common Low
Rules

State Fund
Excl Opt

(1)
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Jillinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N. Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
No. Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

x

(1)

x
x
x
x (2)
x
x (2)
x

x
x
x

(3)
x
x
x
x
x

x

Private
Insurer
x
x
x
x
x
x
X
x
x
x
x
x
X

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x (4)
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x

x

x
x

X
x
x
x
x

X
x

x
x
x (4)

x
x
x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x

x
x
x
x (4)
x
x
x (4)

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x
X

Employer's election to common law waives defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and fellow servant rule.
Failure to insure waives defenses as in (1).
Subject to stated exceptions, all employee injuries are subject to the provisions
of the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, U.S.C. tit. 33, ch. 18
Compulsory as to hazardous employment only.

